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I. SCENE: INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a theatre stage director.' You are one of the lucky
ones. You have had success in your career; with fairly regular employ-
ment, you make ends meet and have a little left over at the end of the
day. Recently, the theatre-going public received one of your shows very
well: The production run was extended, and people commented on the
concept you and the designers created for this play. That show closed
almost a year ago. In the meantime, you have worked on three different
shows, and several other companies have staged different versions of the
play, two of which had notable designs that won awards in their own
right. The last time you saw the playwright, she commented that you
should stage her new works more often, and that if other companies con-
tinue to license her new plays at this rate, she might finally be able to
remodel her kitchen.
One morning, you receive an email from a cast member from that
well-received production a year ago. She was cast in a different role in
another company's production of the play; indeed, you are surprised to
hear from her because you know that they are opening next week. She
I J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Theatre and English, Whitman Col-
lege, 2001. Prior to attending law school, the author was a stage manager, assistant stage manager,
and production assistant for over twenty professional productions, for such varied companies as the
Seattle Opera, Intiman, Colorado Shakespeare Festival, Theatre Schmeater (a fringe company in
Seattle), and the Seattle Children's Theatre; she bases many of her statements regarding how profes-
sional theatre functions on those experiences. The author would like to thank all of her former col-
leagues in the theatre for their help and friendship, both in the development of this Comment and
during each of those shows. The author also thanks Professor Elizabeth Townsend-Gard, Karen
Skretkowicz, and the members of the Seattle University Law Review for their assistance with this
Comment, as well as her friends and family for their endless patience during the writing process.
1. The stage director, or stage manager, is the person in charge of creating the concept for
the production of the play and leading the creative process of the production team.
See Teatrotaller Complete Production Manual, Directing Section,
http://instructI.cit.comell.edu/courses/spanl30l/page6.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
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describes the production to you, and your heart sinks. It is the same as
yours, right down to the molding the scenic designer finally settled on
after three tries, the staging of the pivotal argument, and the color of the
lead actress's wig. You have done enough shows to know that everyone
borrows ideas from each other in this industry, but this is not merely the
borrowing of an idea or a concept-it is a wholesale replication.
What do you do? What can you do? You call the entertainment
lawyer who has helped you with a few things in the past and are com-
pletely dismayed by the answer: "Well, the law is not settled in this area.
No clear precedent prohibits the copying of your work or your designers'
work or requires a production company to give you credit if it does copy
that work. A case can be made for protecting your work under copyright
law, but there are some issues about who might actually own your work,
and, well, no one has actually gotten a decision out of a court in this area
because the few prior cases that made it to court were settled or dis-
missed on other grounds."'
This story is not make-believe. Theatres large and small have be-
come enmeshed in incidents in which directors, designers, or entire pro-
duction teams have claimed that their work on a different production was
copied without permission, credit, or remuneration. 3 Unfortunately, none
of these cases have resulted in a ruling establishing whether the direction
and design of a staged production of a play is protectable property.4
Copyright, a series of protections for the creators of various types of art,
including literature, music, and the visual arts,5 is the most likely protec-
tion, but no specific protection has yet to be extended in this area. Even
if copyright protection is found to apply, the director and designers are
considered employees of the production company that is producing their
work. Thus, the company could own the copyright because the works
were created as works for hire,6 and the creators of the designs would
2. See, e.g., Leslie Carroll, Love! Valour! Compensation! Settles Lawsuit, BACKSTAGE, Apr. 2,
1999, http://www.allbusiness.com/services/amusement-recreation-services/4591208-1.html; Press
Release, Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Joint Press Release Regarding Mullen v.
SSDC, et al. (Dec. 3, 2007).
3. See, e.g., Einhom v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (director sues
former company for continuing to use his staging after his firing); Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Broadway director of Love! Valour! Compassion! sues a Florida theatre company
for copying production design); First Amended Complaint, Mullen v. Soc'y of Stage Dirs. & Chore-
ographers, No. 06 C 6818 (N.D. Ill. 2007), 2006 WL 4031657 (Chicago design team of Urinetown:
The Musical sues for declaratory judgment that its production did not copy Broadway production);
Campbell Robertson, Creative Team of 'Urinetown' Complains of Midwest Shows, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2006, at E3, available at 2006 WLNR 19801617.
4. Einhorn, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 196; Mantello, 947 F. Supp. at 102.
5. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2003).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). An employer is considered the author and owner of a copyright of a
work created by (I) an employee in the scope of employment or (2) an independent contractor hired
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have no right to have that work attributed to them unless they originally
contracted for that right.7
What solutions could the law provide for this situation and what
changes are needed to adequately protect design artists in the theatre in-
dustry? This Comment proposes a two-part solution that can both pro-
tect the creators of productions from unapproved copying of their work
and ensure that significant contributors to that work receive the ongoing
credit they deserve.
The production of a play as a whole is a derivative work of joint au-
thorship; thus, copyright law should protect it. As a work of authorship,
the sum of the design elements that form a production are protectable by
copyright because the production is an original creation; while based on
the text of the play, any given production is developed separately from
the underlying work and merits its own protection.8 Because of the col-
laborative and interdependent nature of a production of a play, musical,
or opera, the resulting combination of all aspects of design and direction
should be protected as a whole rather than as individual elements. Al-
though the copyright protection is collective, there is still a need to give
credit to the individuals who contributed to the final product; Congress
should therefore create a statutory right of attribution for the individual
designers, the director, and the choreographer of a production. This right
would require anyone who uses or reproduces the work done by these
individuals to either give them clear credit for their work or face liability
for statutory damages.
This Comment will proceed in several steps. Part II briefly outlines
the creative process behind a theatrical production. Part III discusses the
current state of copyright law and describes what a right of attribution is
and how it functions. Part IV contends that a production is a derivative
work of joint authorship protectable by current copyright law. Part V
argues that a right of attribution is needed to protect individual contribu-
tors to a production. Finally, Part VI describes the effects these changes
would have on the theatre industry and explains why they would be
beneficial.
to create one of several specific types of work, provided that the contract expressly states that the
work is a work for hire. § 201(b).
7. See §§ 106-106A. These sections enumerate the rights enjoyed by copyright holders: the
right of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public performance and display, and for certain
works, limited rights of integrity and attribution. Id. The right of attribution extends only to picto-
rial and sculptural works; thus, to create an obligation of attribution, a party must contract for it. Id.
8. See infra notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
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II. SIX CHARACTERS IN SEARCH OF AN AUTHOR: WHAT GOES
INTO CREATING A THEATRICAL PRODUCTION
The written text of a play is the foundation for the art that comes
together in a final form to produce a theatrical production presented to an
audience. 9 It is the interaction of the words with the environment created
for the play by the director and designers that creates the final product, as
"[t]here is something to be said in the theatre in terms of form and color
and light that can be said in no other way."' l Before one can analyze
how a production should be protected, one needs some basic background
knowledge about how those forms, color, and light come into being and
how they interact with the text.
In a professional or semiprofessional production, the core creators
of the physical environment are the director and her design team, which
includes the scenic, lighting, costume, and sound designers, as well as a
choreographer for works that include dance or fights. 1 The scenic de-
signer is responsible for the physical environment of the stage, including
scenery and props.1 2 The lighting designer is responsible for lighting that
environment and the action that takes place in it. The costume designer
designs the apparel of the performers, often including wigs and makeup,
as well as clothing.' 3 The choreographer normally develops the dance
movement for a show that includes dance; in a show featuring fighting,
combat, or other specialized movement, there will normally be a separate
fight choreographer or other specialized choreographer.
What this group creates springs from the text of the play; it is a vis-
ual and auditory depiction of the words of the playwright. While design-
ers each have their own individual vision of how to frame the piece, each
team member must work both within the concept that the director and
designers have developed and collaboratively with the other designers so
9. W. OREN PARKER & R. CRAIG WOLF, SCENE DESIGN AND STAGE LIGHTING 3 (7th ed. 1996)
("The significance of drama to the designer is evidenced by the fact that the major portion of a de-
signer's training for the theatre is spent in learning to interpret and expand the ideas of the play-
wright.").
10. ROBERT EDMOND JONES, THE DRAMATIC IMAGINATION 73-74 (1941).
11. PARKER & WOLF, supra note 9, at 12. The same type of team is often assembled for aca-
demic and amateur productions, but variations are frequent, especially for community theatre pro-
ductions and productions featuring school-age performers. This Comment will focus on professional
productions, both because they are the ones most likely to be plagiarized and because of space con-
siderations. The protections it proposes, however, also apply to nonprofessional productions.
12. Properties are designed by a separate individual for some productions, though that person
often works under the supervision or approval of the scenic designer.
13. Wigs and makeup may also be designed or selected by a separate individual.
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that the final product has a sensible artistic result. 14 While the art as a
whole is collaborative, the designers work on the individual aspects of
the production in their individual studios and build those designs in sepa-
rate shops and studios.' 5 Thus, while the director and choreographer are
in rehearsal developing blocking and dance and working with the actors,
the scenic design is often under construction in the scene shop, the light-
ing design is being developed based on scenery and blocking being con-
structed, and the costume designs are being built and fitted. The whole is
brought together during technical rehearsals, when all of the elements of
direction and design are combined on stage with the actors and crew.' 6
Depending upon the complexity of the work, these rehearsals may run
for hours or months, during which time all the distinct aspects of the
work are merged into a production that will be presented for an audi-
ence. 17
The director and designers typically contract with an established
theatre or production company to work on a specific show or shows. A
design team will sometimes come together without a preexisting com-
pany to create a show, especially in a low budget or fringe environment;
otherwise, the production company hires directors and designers to fill
specific roles in a planned production.
In established theatres, a union may represent some members of the
design team. The United Scenic Artists (USA) represents designers,1s
while the Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers (SSDC) repre-
sents directors and choreographers.' 9 Members of USA and SSDC are
required to work under either a collective bargaining agreement with the
production company or a special project contract if there is no collective
agreement in force.20  While under contract to the company, the design
14. TONY DAVIS, STAGE DESIGN 128 (2001). According to scenic designer Richard Hudson,
"[t]heatre is a collaborative art and you have to work as a team with the director, lighting designer,
and costume designer-and all of you have to believe in the concept or it won't work." Id.
15. PARKER & WOLF, supra note 9, at 130.
16. Id. at 558.
17. During the author's tenure in the theatre, she spent as short a period as a few hours to as
long as four weeks in technical rehearsals for shows.
18. United Scenic Artists Local USA 829, About Us,
http://www.usa829.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=l&ltemid=8 (last visited
Mar. 21, 2008).
19. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Membership,
http://www.ssde.org/membership.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
20. See LORT/USA Agreement 2 (July 1, 2005),
http://www.usa829.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=75&ltemid=267 (follow
"LORT Agreement 2005-2009" hyperlink); The League of Resident Theatres and the Society of
Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc. Collective Bargaining Agreement April 15, 2005-April
14, 2009 1 (Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter SSDC CBA], http://www.ssdc.org/LORT 05-09.pdf; see
also Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, supra note 19.
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team, and the director in particular, often has a great deal of artistic free-
dom in creating the production.
This exceptionally brief overview of the theatrical production proc-
ess may serve to illuminate how a play comes into being. In sum, a play
is a carefully designed and crafted work that begins with the playwright's
text, subsequently expressed through the collaborative artistic efforts of
several different individuals.
III. THE CHERRY ORCHARD: CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW
Turning from the production process to the law, this Part will
briefly discuss the basic features of copyright protection, including who
is considered an author, what is required for a work to be considered
fixed, what types of works are covered by copyright, and who owns the
copyright when a work can be protected. U.S. copyright law derives
from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings .... 21 Congress first established copyright laws
under this grant in 1790.22 Holders of copyrights use these laws to pro-
tect the "fruits of intellectual labor, 23 including literature, works of art,
24and motion pictures.
Currently, the Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated .... The protection applies to entirely new works, compi-
lations, and works derived from works already in existence.26 Therefore,
in determining if Copyright Act protections apply to a work, one must
determine not only whether the work is sufficiently original to be consid-
ered an original work of authorship,27 but also whether it is sufficiently
fixed to be granted statutory protection.28
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660.
23. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
24.17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) (2000).
25. § 102(a).
26. § 103(a).
27. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); Southco Inc. v. Kane-
bridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2004).
28. §§ 101, 102 (a) (2000); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
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A. Original Works ofAuthorship
What, then, is originality, and how much of it is required for protec-
tion under the federal copyright statute? In Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme Court determined that origi-
nality requires an author or authors to independently create a work, rather
than copying it from another work.29 The result may closely resemble
another work as long as that resemblance is not the result of copying.30
While the degree of creativity or originality required is fairly low, the
work cannot be completely unoriginal. 3' Therefore, in Feist, a directory
which was composed of unprotectable facts would be eligible for copy-
right protection to protect the selection and arrangement of the informa-
tion had the publisher arranged that information in a somewhat creative
way.32 The phone book in Feist, however, was not copyrightable be-
cause its arrangement, which merely alphabetized the names and num-
bers in a phone book, lacked the originality needed for protection.33
Despite being original and having a bit of creativity, a work still
may lack protection under federal copyright law. In protecting an origi-
nal work of authorship, the United States protects only the expression of
ideas or concepts, not the ideas or concepts themselves. 34 The Copyright
Act specifically excludes "any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work., 35
Courts have developed the doctrines of merger and scenes A faire to pre-
vent authors from monopolizing ideas through copyright protection.
These doctrines are similar; the primary distinction lies in their ap-
plication. The merger doctrine is primarily applied to utilitarian works
that embody factual or technical ideas, while the doctrine of scenes A
faire is typically applied to narrative or fictional works.36 Under the
merger doctrine, if there are so few ways of expressing an idea that the
idea and its expression are essentially the same, the idea and expression
are considered to be merged and copyright protection is not available.37
29. 499 U.S. at 345.
30. Id.; see also Southco, 390 F.3d at 282.
31. Feist Publ 'ns, 499 U.S. at 345. According to the Court, "even a slight amount" of creativ-
ity is sufficient for copyright protection of independently created works. Id.
32. Id. at 363.
33. Id.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 344-45; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 217 (1954).
35. § 102(b).
36. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3.2 (3d ed. 2005).
37. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1991). In one case applying the
merger doctrine, the court held that, because there were only a limited number of practical ways to
arrange information about the outcome in medical malpractice cases, charts containing that informa-
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Similarly, under the doctrine of scenes A faire, copyright protection is not
available for an expression that is necessarily dictated by a concept or
plot point; 38 the doctrine thus precludes expressions that are standard,
commonplace, or required as a result of the use of an idea from creating
the basis for an enforceable copyright. 39 Both doctrines are applications
of the basic concept that copyright protection extends only to expression,
not to the ideas underlying that expression.40  They act to prevent the
monopolization of concepts, ideas, or facts under a law meant to protect
expressions, not ideas.41
The expressions protected by copyright must be original to their au-
thor, but the author need not necessarily start from scratch in order for
41his or her creation to be afforded protection. Collective works and
compilations, as well as derivative works, receive protection.43 A collec-
tive work is a work "in which a number of contributions, constituting
separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a col-
lective whole," while a compilation "is a work formed by the collection
and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coor-
dinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship."" In other words, a collective
work is a form of compilation whose contents can stand on their own as
independent works of authorship, while compilations that are not collec-
tive works comprise elements that may not be protectable.45 The
tion were not copyrightable under that doctrine. Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Pub-
lishers, 672 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The court stated that "[w]hile in theory there are
numerous ways to place this information in chart form, from a practical point of view the number of
ways to organize this information in a useful and accessible manner is limited." Id. The court's
disallowance of copyright protection for the charts prevented the publisher from prohibiting the use
of the underlying data by others. Cf Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir.
2003) (treating photography of a Skyy bottle as a "shared concept" that merits only "thin" copyright
protection against virtually identical copying).
38. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 5, at 53.
39. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004); Ets-Hokin, 323 F.3d at 765. An
example of the sc~nes A faire doctrine can be found in See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983)
(per curiam), where playwright Christopher Durang was sued for copyright infringement based on
similarities between Durang's one-act play An Actor's Nightmare and the plaintiffs play Fear of
Acting. The Ninth Circuit held that ten of the twenty-two alleged similarities between the plays were
unprotected under that doctrine, because they "follow[ed] obviously from the unprotected idea of a
surprised understudy." Id. at 143.
40. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980); SCHECHTER &
THOMAS, supra note 5, at 53.
41. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, § 2.3.2.
42. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991); Gilliam v. ABC,
Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1976).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 345; Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 19-20.
44. § 101.
45. Id. Encyclopedias, anthologies, and periodicals are good examples of collective works,
because they are groupings of independently copyrightable works. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
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protection afforded to compilations and collective works is limited to the
selection and arrangement of those works; protection is not gained on
unprotectable or otherwise protectable contents by simply copyrighting a
compilation containing those contents.46
Derivative works are also protectable despite their origins in al-
ready existing works,47 provided that the underlying work was legally
used. 48 The derivative work's author's ability to use the underlying work
and benefit from the derivation is limited by the scope of the license
granted by the owner of the underlying work. 49 The copyright in a de-
rivative work extends only to the material contributed by the new author;
the rights to the original work remain with the author of the original
work. 50 Derivative works therefore must meet a higher level of original-
ity than nonderivative works in order to qualify for copyright protec-
tion.51 Protection in the derivative work does not give the author any
rights in the original work, nor does it change "the scope, duration, own-
ership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting ma-
terial. 52
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there are many different
permutations of authorship that can create an original work of authorship
that qualifies for copyright protection. An original work of authorship
can consist of entirely new expression, can be a collection of other works
or of unprotectable data, or can be derived from an underlying original
work. The level of originality required is low, though it increases some-
what for works derived from a work already in existence.53 As described
above, expressions of ideas or concepts that are so narrow that protection
of the expression would equate to copyright protection over the idea
cannot be protected as original works of authorship, nor can expressions
whose -depiction is dictated by the underlying idea.54 This broad concept
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.02 (2000). Compilations, however, can be made up of non-
copyrightable works. Id. A possible example would be a "found poem" of advertising slogans too
short for copyright protection. See Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/found
poem (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (defining the term "found poem").
46. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 348.
47. § 103.
48. Id.
49. See Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1976).
50. § 103(b); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990).
51. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 223; L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.
1976) (works based on a work already in the public domain must substantially vary from the original
to be copyrightable).
52. § 103(b).
53. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
45, §3.03.
54. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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of an original work of authorship means that a wide variety of types of
intellectual creations are potentially protectable under the Copyright Act.
B. Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression
To be protected under federal copyright law, a work must not only
be an original work of authorship, but must also be sufficiently fixed in a
tangible form so that it may be reproduced or perceived by another per-
son.55 A work is considered "fixed" when it is embodied "in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, [such that it] is suf-
ficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.' 56
This includes expressions recorded that can be perceived by people un-
aided and those that must be perceived with the aid of a device, such as a
computer hard drive, other forms of digital media, or film.57 This broad
definition is sufficiently flexible to allow the many copyrightable forms
and types of work to be considered fixed in their typical medium of crea-
tion.58
Improvisations, unrecorded performances or broadcasts, and similar
transitory creations are not considered to be fixed and were not intended
to be protected under the federal copyright statute.59 While some kind of
enduring record of the work is required for protection, the author need
not be the individual who creates that final embodiment; the work need
only be fixed under the authority of the original author for the author to
be granted protection under the statute.60 Therefore, a writer may dictate
his or her work to an assistant who transcribes what the writer has said;
the spoken words are fixed by a third party, but the writer is still consid-
ered the author.
55. § 102(a).
56. § 101. Copies and phonorecords are material objects in which works are fixed such that
they can be perceived at a later time; "phonorecords" is the generic term for such objects on which
sound is recorded, while "copies" are objects on which any other type of expression is recorded. Id.
57. §§ 101-102.
58. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665
("[T]he list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject matter, but with sufficient flexibility to
free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories.").
59. Id. ("[A]n unfixed work of authorship, such as an improvisation or an unrecorded choreo-
graphic work, performance, or broadcast, would continue to be subject to protection under State
common law or statute, but would not be eligible for Federal statutory protection under section
102.").
60. § 101; see Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (makeup
applied to the face of performers by artists other than the original designer considered fixed under
the statute).
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C. Enumerated Categories
While a work need only qualify as an original work of authorship
fixed in a tangible form to be protected under the Copyright Act, the
statute provides further guidance about what types of works are currently
considered protectable. It specifically enumerates eight categories of
protected works: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; panto-
mime and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
motion pictures and audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architec-
tural works.61
While these categories provide a helpful shortcut and framework in
determining if a work is protected by copyright, they were not intended
to limit the types of works protectable under the Copyright Act. Accord-
ing to the House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act, the list was intended
to be flexible, so that courts could expand the scope of the enumerated
categories. 62 In the 200-plus years of federal copyright protection, copy-
right has expanded to include both new forms of expression and those
that only gradually came to be recognized as meriting protection.63 Two
such examples are photography and choreography. In Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the new art of photography was recognized
as being sufficiently creative and original so as to produce a work that
merited copyright protection, despite not being specifically enumerated
in the types of works protected by copyright; the Court reasoned that the
photograph was the means "by which the ideas in the mind of the author
are given visible expression.', 64 Similarly, in 1976, Congress amended
the Copyright Act to specifically include choreographic works.65 While
choreography predates copyright protection, this type of work gradually
came to be considered worthy of protection, just as existing law has also
embraced new forms such as photography.
Of special interest in this Comment is the inclusion of the category
of dramatic works in the Copyright Act. The scope of this category has
never been specifically defined; the House Report on the 1976 Copyright
Act declared it one of the categories not requiring a definition
because these works "have fairly settled meanings. 66  Despite this
61. § 102(a)(1)-(8).
62. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53.
63. Id. at51.
64. 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
65. Martha Graham School & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 2004); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52; NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 45, § 2.07(B).
66. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53. House Report 1476 does not give any examples of this "set-
tled definition" for a dramatic work. However, one of the earliest copyright cases dealing with a
play, Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1136 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552), includes in its defini-
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characterization, no ruling has definitively settled whether the category
includes only the text of a written play, or if it also includes the works of
design and direction that are created to bring that text to life on stage. If
intended only to protect the text of a play and, in the case of a musical,
any accompanying music, the category is redundant, since the text is pro-
tected as a literary work, and the music is protected as a musical work.
If, however, the category is meant to be broader, a strong argument can
be made for an individual production being a dramatic work.
D. Ownership of Copyright
The copyright of a work that is protectable under the Copyright Act
initially vests in the author of the work.6 7 "Author," however, does not
always mean the person who actually either physically created or pre-
pared the work.68 An employer or a person who had a work prepared
under specific circumstances can be considered the author of that work,
with the initial ownership of the copyright vesting in the employer or
hiring party.69 Such a work is called a "work for hire.,7 0 A work is con-
sidered to have been made for hire if it was either prepared by an em-
ployee within the scope of his or her employment7 1 or specially ordered
or commissioned for inclusion in one of several statutorily described
types of works.72 When a work is specially ordered or commissioned, it
is considered to be a work for hire only if the parties agree to character-
ize the work as such in writing.73
U.S. copyright law also allows for the joint authorship of original
works. Coauthors of a joint work co-own the copyright,74 and each has
the right to use the work subject to an accounting to the other owners. 75
For two or more creators to be considered coauthors of a joint work, each
author must have intended that each contribution be combined into a
tion of a copyrightable dramatic composition the actions of performers, provided that they constitute
performance of a written work.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
68. § 201(a)-(b); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
69. § 201(b).
70. § 101.
71. Courts generally use federal agency law to determine if someone is working as an em-
ployee. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. Agency law establishes a multifactor balancing test that considers
the hiring party's authority over the work and the manner of its creation, the skill and independence
of the creator, and the nature of the business relationship between the parties. Id. at 751-52.
72. § 101. Specially ordered works may be classified as works for hire when created as a con-
tribution to a collective work; part of a motion picture or audio visual work; translation; supplemen-
tary work prepared as an adjunct to a work by another author to assist in the understanding of that
work; compilation; instructional text; test or test answers; or atlas. Id.
73. Id.; Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1992).
74. § 201 (a).
75. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1990).
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single joint work.76 The coauthors' contributions may be either insepa-
rable or interdependent parts of the final completed work.77 Inseparable
parts only have meaning within the context of the completed project,
while interdependent parts have some independent meaning but achieve
their full significance only within the context of the completed work.78
Whether those contributions must themselves be individually copyright-
able is currently the subject of a circuit split.
The Second and the Ninth Circuits require each author to have in-
dividually copyrightable contributions to a work in order to be consid-
ered a coauthor. 79 The Seventh Circuit, however, recently ruled that in
situations where the final product is copyrightable but the individual con-
tributions that went into that product were not, the authors who made
those nonprotectable contributions should be considered coauthors. 80
The Fourth Circuit has since followed the approach of the Second and
Ninth Circuits in an unpublished case involving sound recordings.81 The
argument for requiring an independently copyrightable contribution usu-
ally emphasizes the use of the term "author" in the statute's description
of a joint work,82 implying that, while unprotectable concepts and works
are created by someone, to be considered an author under the Copyright
Act requires the individual production of a copyrightable work, even if
the final product is the result of collaboration.83 In taking an alternative
approach, the Seventh Circuit argued that where two or more people in-
tended to create a copyrightable work, "it would be paradoxical if though
the result of their joint labors had more than enough originality and crea-
tivity to be copyrightable, no one could claim copyright., 84 Thus, in
works where the nature of the creative process requires different indi-
viduals to contribute elements that are not in themselves copyrightable,
the final work should not be deprived of copyright protection, and the
contributors to that work should have joint authorship.85
The Seventh Circuit's approach is also similar to that followed in
the oft-cited treatise Nimmer on Copyright, which posits that individuals
76. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d
500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991).
77. § 101; Childress, 945 F.2d at 505.
78. Childress, 945 F.2d at 505.
79. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1231; Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998);
Childress, 945 F.2d at 505; Ross, 916 F.2d at 521.
80. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
81. Brown v. Flowers, 196 F. App'x. 178, 188 (4th Cir. 2006).
82. § 101.
83. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233; Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070
(7th Cir. 1994).
84. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658-59.
85. Id.
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who make more than a de minimus contribution to a protectable work
should be considered joint authors, provided that they were acting with
the intent that the contributions be merged.86 While the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Gaiman was limited to the unusual situation where
none of the contributors to the final work had made independently copy-
rightable contributions, the case also makes clear that there should be an
exception to the requirement for independently copyrightable contribu-
tions for ownership when the contributor's work could be protected "be-
cause of the nature of the particular creative process that had produced
it.,,87
The Copyright Act states the basic rule on who owns the copyright
of a work in deceptively simple terms: The author of a work owns a
copyright. If the work is considered a work for hire, however, the author
is the employer of the person who creates the work. Also, a work may
have more than one creator, and every person that contributed to the
creation of a work may not have made a sufficiently significant contribu-
tion to be considered an author. Thus, while most cases of joint author-
ship require individually copyrightable contributions for the contributor
to be considered a joint author, where the final work is protectable but
the contributions of the individual authors are not, authority exists that
supports finding those contributors to be joint authors in order to provide
protection for the resulting work.
E. Right of Attribution
While copyright law exists primarily to protect the economic rights
of the copyright owner,88 the law as it currently stands does not necessar-
ily offer any protection to the creator of a work. While copyright ini-
tially vests in the creator 89 (or in the case of a work for hire, the em-
ployer),90 the ownership of the copyright can be transferred to someone
not involved in the creation of the work.9' Put simply, the original author
can sell his or her various interests in his creation, and under U.S. law, a
careless, ill-informed, or powerless author can lose all of his or her rights
86. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 6.07.
87. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659.
88. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possi-
ble?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
90. § 201(b).
91. § 201(d).
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to his or her work, including the right to be credited with the creation of
the piece.92
In Europe and many other regions around the world, the author of a
creative work has certain "moral rights" over and above those protected
by copyright.93  These rights include the right to be properly credited
with the creation of a work (the right of attribution or paternity), the right
to prevent changes to or the improper display of the work (the right of
integrity), and the right to prevent the publication of the work (the right
of disclosure).94 These rights are often inalienable.95
The Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (Beme) embraced and codified the concept of moral rights.96
Section 6bis of Berne gives authors the right to claim both their author-
ship of the work and to object to any infringements on the integrity of
that work, stating that "the author shall have the right to claim authorship
of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modifica-
tion of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 97  When the United
States joined Berne in 1988 in order to strengthen protection of U.S.
works abroad,98 it had to be make several changes to its copyright laws in
order to comply with Berne's provisions.99 The statutory enactment of
moral rights was not, however, among those changes. Instead, Congress
determined that existing U.S. statutory and common law protections,
including those available under the Lanham Act, 100 protected the rights
92. See Kwall, supra note 88, at 2-3 (stating that the 1976 Copyright Act protects only copy-
right owners and creators, and that to protect their personality interests, creators mainly must rely on
contract, competition, defamation, and privacy laws).
93. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, adopted Sept.
9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne]; Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of
Interests: The Concordance of Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601, 607-08 (2001); Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors'
Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law Compared,
24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 595 (2006).
94. Kwall, supra note 88, at 5-9.
95. Id. at 12.
96. Berne, supra note 93, art. 1. Berne is an international agreement initially established to
protect authors' rights in their literary and artistic works. Id.
97. Id. at art. 6bis(1).
98. S. REP. No. 100-352, at 2 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3707.
99. Id. at 8. The changes related to the protection of architectural works and the formalities
required for copyright protection. Id. at 11.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1127, 1141-1141n (2000). The Lanham Act
is a federal statute primarily concerned with the use of trademarks. It also prohibits producers from
passing off their own goods as someone else's and other forms of unfair competition relating to the
origin of a product. Id.
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of integrity and attribution to an extent sufficient to comply with
Berne. 1'
While limited protection of proper attribution under the Lanham
Act was available at the time the United States adopted Berne, the reach
of the Lanham Act has since been limited.10 2 Prior to 2003, artists claim-
ing a right of attribution or that a work had been inappropriately credited
to him or her would often include a claim of misrepresentation under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 10 3 In Dastar Corp. v. 20th Century Fox
Film Corp., however, the Court held that in the case of communicative
works (in that case particularly, a VHS version of a documentary), the
Lanham Act's requirement that a good not be misleading about its origin
did not refer to the communicative content contained in the physical
item, but rather to who produced the tangible product being sold. 10 4 The
Lanham Act's definition of "origin of goods" was declared "incapable"
of indicating the source of the expressions or ideas that composed a
communicative work.10 5 While the Court hinted that such claims could
potentially be brought under the false advertising portions of the Lanham
Act,10 6 the decision drastically limited the federal statutory options for
the protection of rights of attribution for artists who create nonmaterial
works.10 7 They must once again rely primarily on common law theories
such as unfair competition, misappropriation, or unjust enrichment when
copyright law does not adequately protect their interests.
Unfair competition, including misappropriation and unjust enrich-
ment, is a potential claim that could be brought against a party that has
failed to properly attribute design or directorial work. 10 8 In the few cases
where theatre directors and designers have attempted to use common law
claims to protect their work, they have seen poor results, due both to dif-
ficulties acquiring jurisdiction over defendants, whose failure to properly
attribute a design typically takes place in a distant state, 0 9 and courts that
101. S. REP. No. 100-352, at 9-10.
102. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8D.03.
103. See, e.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1992); Mantello v. Hall,
947 F. Supp. 92, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
104. 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003).
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id. at 38.
107. Id.
108. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1065 (7th Cir. 1994) (claim of unfair
competition and other tort claims in case involving authorship of a dramaturg); Einhorn v. Merga-
troyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (claims included common law misappro-
priation in case involving ownership of direction); Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236,
241 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (claims included false designation of origin in case involving use of makeup
designs); Mantello, 947 F. Supp. at 95 (claims included reverse passing off and unjust enrichment in
suit alleging copying of significant aspects of overall production).
109. Mantello, 947 F. Supp. at 102.
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have failed to recognize a cognizable injury on the part of plaintiff art-
ists.'10
Visual artists have a special federal statute that protects their ability
to take credit for their works. The Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990
(VARA) 11 grants an author of a work of visual art'1 2 the right to claim
ownership over his or her works; the right to prevent others from assert-
ing that the artist created works that he or she did not create; and, subject
to certain limitations, the ability to prevent the destruction of the work or
its distortion or modification if the changes would be prejudicial to the
artist's reputation. 1 3 VARA does not permit the transfer of these rights,
and they are separate from the rights granted by copyright protection. 14
VARA's protections, however, do not extend beyond works of visual art.
For any other work of authorship, the rights protected by VARA must be
either reserved by contract when an author transfers his or her copyright
or protected under other causes of action, such as unfair competition or
defamation. i i5
IV. THE TAMING OF THE SHREW: A PRODUCTION
AS A COPYRIGHTABLE DERIVATIVE WORK
In this collaborative art, then, what is the best way to protect the
finished product? Is a production protectable at all, or is it an unfixed
version of the written text? If the purpose of federal copyright law is to"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," as required by the
Constitution, what, if any, protection should be given to a staged produc-
tion of a play in order to best promote the art form?" 16 There is plainly a
call for some kind of protection from the theatre industry. Cases like
Mantello v. Hall'17 and Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Productions,18 the recent
controversy over Urinetown: The Musical,"9 and the ongoing debate in
trade publications 20 all reveal a need for protection and a clearly articu-
lated rule to guide the industry. The current debate demonstrates a per-
ception in some parts of the industry that what is put onstage deserves
110. Einhorn, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
112. § 101. A work of visual art is defined as "a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture" that
exists either in a single copy or a signed limited edition numbered less than 200. Id.
113. § 106A.
114. § 106A(c).
115. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
117. 947 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
118.426 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
119. Robertson, supra note 3.
120. Compare Joan Channick, Author! Author?, AM. THEATRE, Apr. 2006, at 6, available at
http://www.tcg.org/publications/at/apr06/exec.cfm, with Carroll, supra note 2.
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copyright protection. But what form should that protection take? This
Part applies copyright law to the theatrical production context and con-
cludes that productions are an original, derivative work of the underlying
text; the work is actually fixed in a tangible form; productions already fit
within a reasonable reading of the categories enumerated in the Copy-
right Act; and directors and designers of productions should be consid-
ered joint authors of the works they produce.
A. Originality
The performed version of a play fits the requirements of an original
work of authorship as created by the design team and director. 121 While
their work is derivative of the important work done by the playwright, it
nonetheless satisfies the requirements for originality established by stat-
ute and current case law. Except in cases where the design team and di-
rector choose to copy an already existing production, the choices as to
staging and design are made for the individual production in question.
While certain needs are often expressed in the text of the play itself, how
those needs are met is determined by the design team.122 Moreover, even
in a production attempting to evoke an established or traditional concept,
designers and directors must select and arrange the chosen elements in
order to produce the final effect of the performance. 123
With rare exceptions, a production would be considered to be de-
rivative of the underlying work of the play, musical, or opera, as it is
based and builds on that underlying work.1 24 Indeed, staging a play with-
out the permission of the author would violate the exclusive rights held
by the copyright owner of the underlying work. 125 The copyright statute
defines a derivative work as one in which that underlying work is "re-
cast, transformed, or adapted., 126 Transforming a work from words is a
sufficient recasting of the written work for the end product to be consid-
ered a derivative, especially when one considers the additional artistry
that must be contributed by the directors and designers to make the trans-
formation successful. 127  Even when a playwright gives very specific
121. See discussion supra Part III.A.
122. See PARKER & WOLF, supra note 9, at 30-31.
123. See id. While the director's concept may be a traditional rendering of a play, the specific
choices made by that director and design team to fulfill that concept are new and different for each
production.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
125. § 106(4); see Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976).
126. § 101.
127. Renowned scenic designer and Yale School of Drama Professor Ming Cho Lee has de-
scribed the work of a designer as "transform[ing] words into pictures, visual imagery, the physical
work within which the events take place." DAVIS, supra note 14, at 44.
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directions as to staging and design choices, it would be nearly impossible
(and artistically undesirable) for her to dictate every choice, from the
setting of the work inside a house to the type of carpet on the floor to the
precise manner of scorn with which the wife treats her adulterous hus-
band.
The degree of originality in a theatrical production is sufficient to
qualify for copyright protection, even under the heightened standard ap-
plied to a derivative work. 28 The choices that are made are sufficiently
transformative to meet the heightened standards of originality required
for such a work. A derivative work needs to significantly differ from the
underlying work; 129 while the text of a play or musical often indicates,
sometimes in detail, what the physical environment of the production
should be, those directions can rarely fully articulate the choices that
must be made by the director and designers in order to bring the play to
life.
For example, take Ibsen's description of the Helmer residence at the
beginning of Act I of A Doll's House.130 It is described as a "comfort-
able room," with doors to the left and right on the back wall, a piano be-
tween those doors, doors on the left and right walls, a window, a round
table, armchairs, a small sofa, a rocking chair, china figures, a bookcase
with bound books; and Ibsen gives the placement of these and other
items. 131 It is a winter day, indicating a certain kind of light and some
costume requirements. 132 Even if the director and design team choose to
follow this detailed description, choices and adaptations must be made,
in order to accommodate the physical space in which the play will be
performed, adapt the costumes to the performers, conform to the budget
of the show, and reflect the aesthetic of the production. This description
tells us nothing of what the furniture looks like, the color choices, and
other choices that make the production distinctive. Ibsen also provides
instructions to the director for the blocking, but that blocking must also
reflect the arrangement of the stage, the character choices for the per-
formers, and the lighting choices. 33 The choices that must be made are
more than sufficient to provide the originality required for copyright.
The process of creating the performed production of a play can be
roughly analogized to that of composing the photograph in question in
128. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 47-52 and
accompanying text.
129. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 661.
130. Henrik Ibsen, A DOLL HOUSE 43 (Rolf Fjelde trans., Signet Classic 4th ed. 1992) (1879).
13 1. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Burrow-Giles Lithographic Corp. v. Sarony.134 While a unique person,
Oscar Wilde, served as the existing impetus of the photo, the photogra-
pher's work in selecting Wilde's costume, selecting and arranging the
draperies and accessories staging the shoot, arranging the light and
shade, and evoking the subject's desired expression transformed the re-
sulting photo into a protectable work of art. 135 The designers and direc-
tor of a production fulfill a similar role as the photographer in Burrow-
Giles, except that instead of creating a particular vision of an individual,
they are creating a unique presentation of a written work.
The scenes A faire and merger doctrines1 36 would function as they
do when applied to other copyrightable works. They would serve to pre-
vent the stifling of art by preventing the protection of similar choices that
are dictated by the text of the play. If all the choices that must be made
to put the text on stage are made in the text, the scenes A faire doctrine
would prevent the direction and designs from qualifying for copyright
protection. 137 Yet while some people see the traditional interpretations of
even well-known plays as a limitation,' 38 many directors and designers
see those traditional interpretations as a challenge to do something dif-
ferent. Juliet may be required to be overheard by Romeo in the famous
balcony scene, and while it is traditionally done with her leaning out over
the balustrade of her bedroom balcony, the only actual requirement dic-
tated by the text is that she be unaware of the presence of her lover. 139
While coming up with an alternative may be difficult, it can be done ef-
fectively. 140  If a work is still under copyright and the author does not
desire an experimental approach, the author still holds all rights in the
underlying work and can limit the production through the licensing
agreement. 141
134. 111 U.S. 54(1884).
135. Id. at 60.
136. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
137. See Ets-Hokin v Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003).
138. See David Leichtman, Comment, Most Unhappy Collaborators: An Argument Against the
Recognition of Properly Ownership in Stage Directions, 20 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 683, 712 (1996)
(discussing the historical use of so-called "mandatory" scenes in well-known plays).
139. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MOST EXCELLENT AND LAMENTABLE TRAGEDIE OF ROMEO
AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
140. For an example of a fresh take on an oft-produced work in the opera world, see Julie
Taymor's version of Mozart's The Magic Flute that was widely broadcast in early 2007. Ms. Tay-
mor's production was highly stylized and primarily aimed at family audiences, a rarity in opera.
Anthony Tommasini, An Opera at the Met That's Real and 'Loud', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at El,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/arts/music/0lflut.html?_r =1 &orefrslogin.
141. The control over productions exercised by Samuel Beckett, and by his estate after his
death, exemplifies an author's ability to control a production through licensing. Productions that do
not comply with the specific instructions given in the text for the gender of the characters, the
movement of the performers, or the scenic design lose their performance licenses. Mel Gussow,
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Nor would the traditional concept of a moonlit Juliet on her bed-
room balcony be locked up by the first production to employ that stag-
ing. While the specific manner of portraying that idea may be protect-
able, the idea of a traditional balcony love scene is not, because copy-
right can only protect the unique expression of the idea, not the idea it-
self.142 If the performance options for the scene are so limited by the text
that protecting the expression would protect the idea, merger would pre-
vent the protection of that expression, 143 but again, the idea itself is never
protectable. Copyright protection is not structured to prevent another
company from using a similar concept in a production, but rather to pre-
vent copying how that concept is expressed.
A production of a play or musical has sufficient originality to merit
copyright protection as a derivative work based on the underlying text,
because of the significant choices, selections, and original design and
director work that go into the production. If the playwright has made all
such choices in the text, the scenes A faire doctrine would prevent the
copyrighting of those choices; moreover, the playwright always retains
the option of limiting a production's artistic choices through his licensing
agreement for the performance of his text.
B. Fixation
A theatrical production is also sufficiently fixed so as to be entitled
to copyright protection. At least one critic has argued that productions
are not sufficiently fixed to qualify for copyright protection, 144 and in-
deed, to the audience member, each performance of a play appears to be
an almost spontaneous affair. In reality, that appearance of spontaneity
is fixed in such a manner that it may be reproduced, with minimal varia-
tion for each performance. The physical aspects of the production are
physically constructed from plans and sketches, while the direction and
choreography are recorded in notation specifically created to allow dif-
ferent performers to recreate the same movement. The Copyright Act
requires only that the work be fixed in a manner that allows for percep-
tion, reproduction, or any other form of communication of the work;
while the notation used to record choreography and movement may not
be easily readable to a lay person, the record can be read, perceived, and
Modify Beckett? Enter, Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1994, § 1, at 19, available at 1994 WLNR
3528236; Jeanne Whalen, Directors, Take Note: Samuel Beckett Was a Micromanager, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2006, at Al.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
143. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2003).
144. Beth Freemal, Note, Theatre, Stage Directions & Copyright Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1017, 1028-29 (1996).
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reproduced by someone who works in the industry. Because the author
need not be the party to fix a work in order for the work to qualify for
copyright protection, the collaborative effort to fix the production does
not impact the work's copyright protection.
The scenery, props, and costumes are fixed: They are created from
plans and sketches created by the designers and then constructed in a
tangible, three-dimensional form for the production. 45  The lighting,
while of a less tangible nature, is similarly fixed by way of lighting plots,
renderings, and the use of a computerized lighting system that records
the instruments used, the level of brightness, and the speed of the
changes in those choices for every moment in the play. 146 Sound effects
can be similarly programmed into a computer, where a program plays
back the needed sound, at the proper volume, through the correct speak-
ers, with a single keystroke. 147 In less technologically advanced venues,
the sound cues are recorded onto CD or minidisk and played back
through a mixing board under the direction of a cue sheet created by the
designer. 148 Choreography can be recorded by any kind of notation that
allows other performers to study and reproduce the movements. 149
Stage direction poses the most significant fixation problem. The
movements of actors, and their interactions with each other and their en-
vironment, appear to many to be entirely unset; the actors apparently
possess discretion to change their movements, and reproduction seems
impossible, unless someone is videotaping the performance. 150 While
any given performance has subtle variations, a director's work is set at
the end of the rehearsal process, at which point it is recorded in a prompt
book or similar script or score in shorthand notation by either the stage
manager or an assistant director; it is not to be changed without a com-
pelling reason during the run of the particular production. 151 The record
of the director's choices made in the blocking script or stage manager's
145. PARKER & WOLF, supra note 9, at 96.
146. Id at 450-51,535-37.
147. Id. at 365.
148. Id. at 343-44.
149. The most well-known dance notation is Labanotation, which uses a vertical score to re-
cord which part of the body is doing what movement in what direction and how quickly the move-
ment is done. Dance Notation Bureau, Read a Good Dance Lately?, http://dancenotation.org/DNB/
(follow "Notation Basics" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
150. See Freemal, supra note 144, at 1027.
151. While one commentator has suggested that creation of a prompt book recording stage
direction is beyond the scope of the license granted by the playwright, Leichtman, supra note 138, at
693, the industry norm is that such a record be created. Because of the intricacy of the interaction
between the stage movement, lighting, scenic and sound cues, costume changes, and other events
that must be managed and maintained, a prompt book is a virtual necessity for a show to run effec-
tively.
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prompt book must be sufficiently concrete to allow an understudy who
has never seen that particular production to be rehearsed and inserted
into the show. The blocking notes must also be sufficient for a new stage
manager, unfamiliar with the show, to be able to call light, sound, and
scenery cues, as well as some performer entrances. The design team cre-
ates all of this information; the stage manager records and implements
the creation. 152 Her job is similar to that of the artisan physically creating
the works authored by another, in that the prompt book is compiled un-
der the authority of the director and designers (who frequently correct
and supplement what the stage manager initially recorded). The prompt
book then becomes a record of the stage direction and the placement of
the various show cues that enable that work to be reproduced. Because
the author need not be the one to physically fix his or her work in its final
form to qualify for copyright protection, 15 3 her arrangement for the future
reproduction of the theatrical production constitutes a fixation that satis-
fies the requirements of the Copyright Act.
C. Enumerated Categories
While a theatrical production is sufficiently original and fixed to
qualify for copyright protection, statutory protection for a production
would be a more certain result if a production was considered to be
within one of the enumerated categories established by the 1976 Copy-
right Act.' 54 The most obvious placement for a production would be in
the dramatic works category, 55 but aspects of the production could also
be viewed as pictorial or sculptural works, 156 works of pantomime or
choreography,' 57 or sound recordings. 58 There is no requirement that a
work fit neatly into one category; in the House Report on the 1976 Act, it
was noted that a work in one category may also contain aspects of works
in other categories. 59 While Congress did not intend that these catego-
ries delineate the scope of protected works 160 or prevent courts from rec-
ognizing the protectability of new or different forms,' 61 recognition that a
152. See PARKER & WOLF, supra note 9, at 258.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (creator of makeup designs need not be the one to fix them on the faces of performers in order
for the works to be considered fixed in a tangible form).
154. § 102(a).
155. § 102(a)(3).
156. § 102(a)(5).
157. § 102(a)(4).
158. § 102(a)(7).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 51-52.
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theatrical production fits into one or more of these categories would help
ensure Copyright Act protection for this type of work.
While the scope of the dramatic works category in the enumerated
categories of the Copyright Act can be interpreted as including only the
text of such a work, such a reading renders a separate category for such
works superfluous, because, depending on their content, they could al-
ready be protected as literary works, 162 musical works, 163 or panto-
mimes. 164 Additionally, when one looks at cases involving the motion
picture and television industries, the final motion picture work is often
viewed as a dramatic work that is a derivative work of the underlying
script. 165 Construing the dramatic works category broadly not only ac-
knowledges these similarities and eliminates redundancy in the enumer-
ated categories, but also better protects a valuable, long-standing art
form.
D. Joint Authorship of the Production
If a production is a work of authorship that receives copyright pro-
tection, then who owns the copyright? To begin with, a theatrical pro-
duction is a work of joint authorship because of the collective nature of
the work's creation. The key consideration in deciding whether a work
is a work of joint authorship is the intent of the collaborators: They must
intend that their work be merged into a single whole. 166 In a collabora-
tive art such as the theatre, where the intent is to create a unified end
product for an audience, the intent to create a single work that is the sum
of the merged parts is evident. While some of the parts may be separa-
ble, the intent is to create a single final work in the whole of the produc-
tion.1 67 Although multiple authors may do a great deal of their work in-
dependently, they intend that each of their separate pieces will eventually
come together to form a whole. Therefore, each of these authors should
jointly own the work on which they collaborated. The situation is analo-
gous to that of lyrics and music for a song; the fact that each was created
independently and are separable does not negate the intention of the
composers that the independent parts be joined and enjoyed by others as
a unitary whole.1 68
162. § 102(a)(1).
163. § 102(a)(2).
164. § 102(a)(4).
165. Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1976).
166. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1994).
167. DAVIS, supra note 14.
168. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir.
1944) (song and lyrics created at different times by different authors working entirely independently
[Vol. 31:667
An Unaccountable Familiarity
The problem then becomes whether each designer's and director's
contributions to a production must be individually copyrightable in order
for that individual to be considered a joint author. While most circuits
that have published opinions on this subject have required such a contri-
bution, 69 the Seventh Circuit recently confronted the problems raised by
such a requirement in the context of collaborative arts. 170 Although the
court dealt with comic books rather than the performing arts, 17 1 its analy-
sis proves equally apt in the context of theatre productions. Many as-
pects of a production are potentially copyrightable individually (scenic
and lighting design, choreography, and sound design, for example),172
but the blocking and characterizations produced by the stage director
might not be if the other aspects of the production were removed. 173
Also, costumes are currently not individually protectable, because the
Copyright Office considers them clothing that cannot be protected due to
its utility. 174 While the individual protectability of the components of a
play is in some cases questionable, the particular creative process that
creates the finished product in theatre results in these parts being interde-
pendent; while there may be problems in copyrighting the individual
contributions on their own, protection of the whole is merited. 75 The
final product is an expression of both the ideas planted by the underlying
play and the interpretations of those ideas created by the director and
designers. Denying copyright protection to productions would retard,
rather than promote, progress in the art, because there would be no pen-
alty for copying another's work without compensation.
This result is something of an expansion of Judge Richard Posner's
argument against the irrational outcome that would have resulted from
requiring all contributors to make individually copyrightable contribu-
tions in order to be authors in Gaiman. There, a protectable work would
have been left without protection because there would have been no au-
thor who could claim infringement; none of the authors in that case had
created a work of joint authorship because intent of parties was that the independent pieces would
merge into a single work).
169. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945
F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990).
170. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
171. Id. at 648.
172. Copyrights have been registered for scenery, U.S. Copyright No. VAu342689 (registered
Sept. 26, 1995) (technical drawings for scenery registered as works of visual art), and lighting de-
signs, U.S. Copyright No. TX6382351 (registered June 30, 2006) (computer text of lighting design
for musical drama registered as textual work).
173. See Richard Amada, Note, Elvis Karaoke Shakespeare and the Search for a Copyright-
able Stage Direction, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 677, 683-84 (2001).
174. Policy Decision Notice, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (Nov. 5, 1991).
175. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659.
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made an individual contribution that would entitle them to ownership.176
In the case of a production, where some of the design team may have an
individually copyrightable contribution that is part of the collective work,
requiring such a contribution could leave some members of the team
with ownership of the whole while other members are left not just unpro-
tected, but with less future compensation if the production is licensed.
Recognizing the collective nature of the art and allowing the director and
design team to be joint owners of the work, regardless of the individual
copyrightability of their contribution, would better promote the art than
either not protecting those aspects, or cutting the noncopyrightable con-
tributors out of copyright ownership in the whole.
A holistic approach to copyright protection, treating a production as
a single work, best balances the need for the creators of the production to
protect their work from unauthorized copying with the need to support
the collaborative nature of the art. Such an approach also protects the
aspects of the production that, standing alone, might not be protectable
under current copyright law. Such an acknowledgement would also cre-
ate the potential for the designs and direction as a whole to be licensed
and reproduced, allowing production companies a means to legally re-
produce the famous version of the production. 177 The impact of such a
change on the theatre industry will be examined in Part VI. Next, how-
ever, Part V discusses the need for a right of attribution for contributors
to theatre productions.
V. TOPDOG/UNDERDOG: A RIGHT OF ATTRIBUTION
While granting copyright protection to a play's production as a
whole provides important legal protections for the design team's artistic
work and the owners of the production, the individual artists whose con-
tributions created the copyrightable work also require protection. They
deserve proper credit for their work. A right of attribution would help
secure that credit and provide a cause of action to reacquire that credit,
with damages, if those rights are not properly respected. This Part dis-
cusses why such a right is needed, what the right would require, and
what remedies an artist could seek if the right was infringed.
A. The Case for a Right of Attribution
The basic argument for a right of attribution is simple: Under cur-
rent law, theatre artists have no right to have their work properly
176. Id. at 658-59.
177. Indeed, both the Mullen and Mantello settlements resulted in the payment of the equiva-
lent of licensing fees to the creators of the work. Carroll, supra note 2; Press Release, Society of
Stage Directors and Choreographers, supra note 2.
[Vol. 31:667
2008] An Unaccountable Familiarity 693
attributed to them unless they contracted for attribution. The Dastar
Court curtailed an artist's ability to use the Lanham Act to secure proper
attribution. 7 8 Acquiring proper attribution via common law tort claims
is problematic. 179 Leaving the matter to private contracting assumes a
certain amount of legal savvy and leverage that a director and designer
may not have.180 The establishment of an affirmative right to attribution
can overcome these difficulties.
1. Attribution and Current Law
The common law, while providing a remedy in cases of copying, is
insufficient to protect the interests of theatre artists. The theories of un-
fair competition, 181 misappropriation, 182 and unjust enrichment1 83 have all
been utilized in court cases involving theatre or other forms of fine art.
While common law remedies can provide a certain amount of protection
for theatre artists, they present practical problems that make them inade-
quate to protect artists' interests in proper attribution.
Misappropriation, unjust enrichment, defamation, and unfair com-
petition claims face practical problems with preemption and jurisdiction.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act expressly preempts any common law
or state statutory protections that provide rights considered "equivalent"
to those provided in the federal statute. 84 In practice, courts have inter-
preted this requirement as creating a two-prong test for potentially pre-
empted common law theories and state statutes. First, if the common law
or state statute would be violated by an act that would otherwise violate
one of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders by the Copyright
Act, the common law or state statute is likely preempted.185 Second, the
subject matter protected by the provision must be within the subject mat-
ter protected by the Copyright Act. 186
178. Dastar Corp. v. 20th Century Fox Film Co., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003). See also NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8D.03.
179. See infra Part V.A. 1.
180. See infra Part V.A.2.
181. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980). A
common law claim of unfair competition may stem from any business practice that goes against
honest practice. 87 C.J.S. Trademark § 98 (2000).
182. See, e.g., Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240-41 (1918) (defining
misappropriation as taking the work of another and selling that product as one's own, thereby bene-
fiting from the work of another).
183. See, e.g., Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306-07 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding that state law unjust enrichment claim was preempted by Copyright Act).
184. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
185. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 5, at 269-70.
186. Id.
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This test puts common law protection of attribution into a grey zone
of validity. While the federal statute does not explicitly protect a right of
attribution in most cases, 187 if the parties with a right of attribution were
also copyright holders, the performance of a production without permis-
sion or attribution could be seen as a single violation of the author's pub-
lic performance rights. Additionally, as previously discussed, the subject
matter is likely, but not assuredly, protected by the Copyright Act., 88
Any attribution case brought under common law protection faces a sig-
nificant likelihood of dismissal on the basis that the cause of action will
be considered preempted by the federal statute.
Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is far less speculative and illus-
trates a more practical problem. These common law claims are state tort
claims.1 89 A plaintiff pursuing state common law claims for a lack of
attribution must choose one of several rough roads. The plaintiff could
attempt to bring the state law claims along with copyright infringement
claims as ancillary claims in federal court.1 90 Such an action, however, is
not possible unless there are federal claims to attach the state law claims
to, 191 and the plaintiff would need to establish personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.192 The plaintiff could attempt to proceed in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction, so long as the alleged damages exceeded
$75,000 for the failure to attribute; 93 moreover, he would need to estab-
lish that a substantial part of the actions that gave rise to the claim oc-
curred in the judicial district where the claim was brought, in order for
venue to be appropriate. 194 Alternatively, the plaintiff could proceed in
state court. Again, the plaintiff would have to establish personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant and might possibly be forced to proceed in the
state where the questionable production took place, unless his home
state's long arm statute applied. 95 As Joe Mantello discovered when he
sued a Florida theatre company for common law violations under New
York law in federal district court, establishing jurisdiction when the pro-
duction in question is presented out of state is extremely difficult-his
suit was initially dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
187. S. REP. No. 100-352, at 9-10 (1988), as reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714-15.
188. See supra Part IV.
189. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 5, at 261.
190.28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
191. Id.
192. See Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92, 96-102 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 45, § 12.01.
193. § 1332(a).
194. § 1391(a).
195. See Mantello, 947 F. Supp. at 96-102.
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defendant.' 96  If a working professional is presented with the option of
either not pursuing a common law claim or having to go to court on the
other side of the country, state common law protection becomes too bur-
densome to pursue.
2. Contracting for Attribution
A director or designer always has the option to contract to require a
theatre or production company to provide proper billing for both the ini-
tial production and for any subsequent remounts or transfers. Indeed,
this is a common occurrence.197 The collective bargaining agreements of
both the SSDC and USA include detailed sections delineating the re-
quirements for billing for their members work. 98 Nonunion agreements
also frequently include clauses with specific requirements for billing, as
well as those protecting the intellectual property interests of the directors
or designers. 99 While leaving the issue in the hands of the contracting
parties allows them complete control over the end result, the lack of a
legal right as backup leaves parties lacking either the knowledge or lev-
erage to contractually secure a right to attribution without protection.
Moreover, a nonparty contributor is left without an affirmative cause of
action if his or her right to attribution is trampled.
First, in order to contract for a right of attribution, the artist must
know that these interests require specific protection in the contract and
for what, specifically, to contract; in addition, the artist must have suffi-
cient leverage in the negotiations to have the term included in the con-
tract. When working under a union contract, the artist receives protec-
tion, but many theatres, even large ones, do not necessarily operate under
union agreements for directors and designers.200 In such situations, it is
possible that an individual artist will not even be aware that he or she
196. Id. The case later settled after Mantello refiled on different grounds. Carroll, supra note
2.
197. See, e.g., LORT/USA Agreement, supra note 20, at 12 (requiring that "[t]he Designer
shall receive billing in the program on the title page, cast page, or with placement substantially com-
parable to such, and on houseboards"); Seattle Children's Theatre Contracts for Sound & Set De-
signers, § 6 (on file with author) [hereinafter SCT Contracts]; SSDC CBA, supra note 20, at 30
(requiring that "[w]ith respect to each covered production directed by a Director, he/she shall receive
billing in all programs and houseboards"). Also, in the author's experience, the program commonly
given to audience members identifies the performers, directors, and designers of that production.
198. LORT/USA Agreement, supra note 20, at 12; SSDC CBA, supra note 20, at 30.
199. SCT Contracts, supra note 197.
200. See Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Signatories List,
http://www.ssdc.org/signatories.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). While many major theaters have
agreements with the SSDC, many do not; in fact, some theatres and producers vehemently refuse to
deal with the union. See Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Strike & Default Lists,
http://www.ssdc.org/strike.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
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must be proactive in order to keep his or her name attached to the work
produced, let alone have the negotiating power to require the production
company to amend the contract.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, while contracting can effec-
tively protect an artist whose work is remounted by the company that
originally produced it or whose final work product is rented or even sold
(a common practice in opera), it provides no protection for the artist
whose work is copied without permission. The recent skirmish over a
production of Urinetown: The Musical in Chicago is such an example.2 1
The production in question allegedly copied directly most of the design
and directorial choices of the Broadway production.20 2 There was no
agreement between the Broadway company or producers and the Chi-
cago production;2°3 enforcement of a contractual right of attribution was
impossible because the copying party was not a party bound by the con-
tract. The individual members of the design team, had they not retained
ownership of the copyright, would have had no recourse.
3. Value of Attribution for Theatre Artists
In the theatre world, artists' inability to require third parties to give
them credit when the third parties make use of their work creates a sig-
nificant problem. While receiving credit for one's work is often more a
matter of recognition than an issue about compensation,20 4 one of the
main reasons that receiving that credit is so critical is because of the im-
portance of one's professional reputation in a performance-based indus-
try such as theatre.
Cases dating back to the 1960s have acknowledged that a per-
former's reputation is a valuable commodity. In Lahr v. Adell Chemical
Co., for example, the court acknowledged that using an imitation of the
voice of Bert Lahr (better known as the Cowardly Lion in the movie The
Wizard of Oz) in a commercial could result in damage to Lahr's reputa-
tion as a performer and that "[s]uch passing off is the basic offense. 20 5
Similar damage can be done to a director or designer whose works
are either copied without credit or who is mistakenly credited with work
that is not his or her own. Many directors and designers work freelance,
and the success or failure of his or her earlier works can have a direct
201. First Amended Complaint, supra note 3; Chris Jones, 'Urinetown'Battle Roils the World
of Musicals, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2006, Arts & Entertainment section, at 1; Robertson, supra note 3.
202. Jones, supra note 201; Robertson, supra note 3.
203. Jones, supra note 201.
204. Talia Yellin, New Directions for Copyright: The Property Rights of Stage Directors, 24
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 317, 321 (2001).
205. 300 F.2d 256, 258-59 (1st Cir. 1962).
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impact on that individual's chances for future employment. The profes-
sional reputation of a designer or director is damaged when he or she
either fails to receive proper credit for a successful rendition of his or her
work, or receives undeserved ignominy for a substandard production. In
an unpublished case, a district court found that there was a "substantial
possibility of destroying the goodwill associated with Gershwin works
by mutilating the carefully sculptured works of art so tenaciously pre-
served by Mr. Gershwin over the years," when a group used those works
beyond the scope of its license.20 6 In an industry built on reputation, both
within the industry and with the public, failure to receive proper credit is
both personally disheartening and financially damaging.
20 7
What is the proper method to protect a theatre artist's claim to his
or her work? Lanham Act claims have been limited by Dastar, common
law remedies are difficult to pursue, the Copyright Act does not protect
attributive interests, and contracting requires knowledge and negotiating
power and cannot protect against design theft.20 8 Theatre artists who do
not receive proper attribution for their work lose an important boost to
their reputations and future careers. A different approach is needed. A
right of attribution must be established for the contributors to the copy-
rightable work of a production.
B. What the Right Requires
The right of attribution advocated by this Comment would essen-
tially codify the theatre industry's current crediting practice,20 9 creating a
legal right to attribution very similar to that given to the authors of works
of visual art under VARA. The First Circuit recently described, in the
context of VARA, a right of attribution as being
the right of an artist to be recognized by name as the author of
his work or to publish anonymously or pseudonymously, the
right to prevent the author's work from being attributed to some-
one else, and to prevent the use of the author's name on works
206. Gershwin v. Whole Thing Co., No. CV 80-569 TJH (Px), 1980 WL 1182, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 1980).
207. See Gershwin, 1980 WL 1182, at *6. In Gershwin, the court ordered a preliminary in-
junction based on the "substantial possibility" of the goodwill associated with Gershwin works being
undermined or destroyed by an unauthorized production incorporating different songs from different
Gershwin works. Id. at *3-*4. Thus, at least one court has acknowledged the importance of reputa-
tion to a theatre artist when his works are misused. An absolute failure to credit would be potentially
even more damaging.
208. See supra Part V.A. 1-2.
209. See supra note 197.
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created by others, including distorted editions of the author's
original work. 1°
An attribution would be required to identify each designer and
credit that designer for his or her work on the pertinent portion of the
production, as is typically done in the program given to the audience at-
tending the play.211 The attribution would also be required to reasonably
identify the copyrightable production the work originated from. For ex-
ample, in the phrase "The Original Broadway Production of Urinetown:
The Musical," the portion that reads "Original Broadway Production"
denotes the production's origination. The specific form of the attribution
should be somewhat flexible so that it can be adapted to best indicate
which specific production of a play, musical, or opera is being used,
without requiring burdensome detail. Both the public and members of
the industry would be spared confusion by requiring this form of attribu-
tion if a single designer has worked on multiple versions of the same
text. This attributive right would not be alienable, but similar to the right
under VARA, it could be waived if an artist does not want to be con-
nected with a particular production.212 Misattribution of a work to an
author would not be permitted.
If establishing a statutory basis for a right of attribution in the thea-
tre would be straightforward, why not include a right of integrity similar
to that provided for in VARA? Such a right would give a theatre de-
signer the right to prevent any intentional modification of his or her work
that is potentially prejudicial to the designer's "honor., 213 Unlike the
right to attribution advocated in this Comment, which only requires that
the contributors be given proper credit for their work, a right of integrity
would bar any significant changes to the final product created by the de-
sign team. 214 The potential impact of a right of integrity on the industry
and art of the theatre is significant, making any modifications that might
arise from moving the production from one venue to another a possible
215source of litigation.21  Also, while attribution is already fairly well
210. Philips v. Pembroke, 459 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2006).
211. Such attribution is also required by most design and direction contracts. See supra note
197.
212. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2000).
213. § 106A(a)(3).
214. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995); see also NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 45, § 8D.04.
215. Carter, 71 F.3d at 81. The Carter court described the right of integrity as the right of an
author to prevent "any deforming or mutilating changes to his work, even after title in the work has
been transferred." Id. Thus, integrity and threats of lawsuits based on a right of integrity could
severely restrict how, or even if, a production company would be willing to rent a show or make
alterations to adapt design work to a different space.
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established and supported in the theatre industry, as discussed below, a
right to integrity has yet to gain much support.
Currently in the theatre industry, deference given to original crea-
tors is somewhat lower than an absolute right of integrity.21 6 Though
granted a great deal of respect, designers are not given the absolute right
to control their work after a show opens. For example, under the USA
collective bargaining agreement, producers must consult the original de-
signers to the best of their ability when changes are made to a design,
and the original designers are given a right of first refusal.217 Establish-
ing a right of integrity would impose a foreign requirement on the theatre
industry rather than codify typical and expected practices. Thus, a right
of integrity would probably receive minimal support from the very artists
it is intended to protect.
C. What Happens if the Right of Attribution Is Violated?
A director or designer whose work was used without the proper at-
tribution described above would have a right to sue for injunctive relief
as well as actual and statutory damages and attorney's fees. Artists need
an injunctive remedy to fulfill the actual purpose of the proposal: to pre-
serve the creative product's identification with the creator. Statutory
damages would serve two purposes. First, statutory damages give indi-
viduals whose attribution rights are violated an incentive to pursue legal
action. Second, statutory damages aid courts in determining an award
because actual damages resulting from misattribution could be incredibly
difficult to prove. Damages of any sort provide an additional disincen-
tive for companies who are tempted to copy works without giving
credit.218
Any individual bringing a successful suit under this right would be
allowed to request attorney's fees. While VARA does not allow the
court to award attorney's fees,2 19 generally speaking, artists whose work
is improperly used will only be able to secure representation if the court
allows them to recover attorney's fees. As damages in these cases might
be fairly low, even with a provision for statutory damages, and pay in the
industry is also typically low, contingent or hourly basis fee arrange-
ments become a losing arrangement for attorneys. Thus, fee recovery
216. See LORT/USA Agreement, supra note 20, at 12.
217. Id.
218. Of course, for a copyrighted production, the primary disincentive would be a potential
copyright infringement suit.
219. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A, 113 (2000). Congress did not authorize the recovery of attomey's
fees in VARA violation cases. See id.
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provisions both enable artists to secure representation and make violating
artists' rights even less attractive.
VI. THE GRAPES OF WRATH: INDUSTRY IMPACT
AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF CHANGE
The changes advocated in this Comment are neither radical nor
revolutionary; rather, they are an overdue codification of traditional
industry practice and custom. The concerns likely to arise in the industry
over the transformation of custom into law merit discussion. Yet none of
the likely arguments present negative impacts that outweigh the benefits
of providing established legal protection to directors and designers.
While playwrights are concerned that they will lose creative control over
their works, a proper understanding of how copyright protects derivative
works shows that this concern arises from a misinterpretation of current
law. Joint copyright ownership also presents manageability issues that
warrant discussion, but similar complications present no bar to joint
ownership of other types of property. This Part addresses these likely
concerns.
A. Impact of Recognizing Copyright
Protection for the Production
While allowing the protection of a whole production would clarify
which protections are available for the works created by the theatre di-
rectors and designers working today, simply examining the legal doc-
trines and applying them to the situation results in too shallow of a look
into the matter. Theatre artists worry about how copyright or other pro-
tections would affect the industry, including the possible impact on the
rights of the playwright and the difficulties of managing a jointly owned
production. The impact of any changes must be weighed in light of these
concerns, and the benefits of enactment must outweigh any negative im-
pact. Additionally, we should consider whether simply allowing copy-
right protection will be an adequate or appropriate remedy to address the
growing concern about plagiarism.
A key concern in the industry about protecting any aspects of a play
beyond the text is the potential impact of such protection on the rights of
the playwright.2 2 ° In a policy statement, the Dramatists Guild22t claims
that allowing directors and other theatrical collaborators to protect their
220. Channick, supra note 120.
221. The Dramatists Guild of America is a professional organization working to "advance the
interests of playwrights, composers, lyricists and librettists writing for the living stage." Dramatists
Guild of America, About the Dramatists Guild of America,
http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
[Vol. 31:667
An Unaccountable Familiarity
work in staging a production would limit the playwright's ability to con-
trol his or her play.222 The Guild also claims that any use of the text of
the play to establish such rights infringes on the copyright of the play-
wright. 23  While the Guild is right to be proactive in protecting its
members' right to control their works, its fears of loss of control and
infringement are legally groundless, because current copyright law bal-
ances the protection of original and derivative works.
A derivative work can only be protected by copyright if the under-
lying work is used with permission and any copying or performance of
the derivative work also requires permission for use of the underlying
work.224 The rights in the derivative work do not subsume those in the
original work.225 Thus, protection for the derivative work created by the
director and designers of an individual production of a playwright's work
leaves the underlying work's copyright intact; any further use of that de-
rivative work would require licensing the underlying work as well as the
derivative production.226 A playwright would be able to maintain control
of his or her work, even to the point of refusing to grant rights to the
script or later withdrawing those rights should the playwright dislike the
chosen production.227 The playwright would also be able to control his
or her work through more restrictive licensing, as the use of the play in
the derivative work is limited by the scope of the license granted by the
original copyright holder.228 A production company that is granted the
right to make a derivative work in the form of a production has no power
to grant any rights to other parties that the playwright did not originally
grant to it.229 Granting a production copyright protection only protects
those who have made the derivative work from unauthorized copying; it
does not limit the control of the playwright over his or her work.
An additional, albeit unenforceable, check on any potential risks to
the playwright in granting protection to a production is the theatre indus-
try's traditional deference to the playwright's role and work.230 Fealty to
the playwright's work is a core value in the theatre community. While
intrinsic core values can be compromised, especially when money and
222. Dramatists Guild of America, Guild Statements - Dramatists' Copyright & Intellectual
Property Rights, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about-statements-copyright.aspx (last visited Mar.
22, 2008).
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
226. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990); Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d
Cir. 1976).
227. See supra note 141.
228. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20.
229. Id.
230. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 52.
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property rights come into play, artistic deference gives a playwright a
great deal of practical control, especially when the playwright must give
permission for the copyrighted work to be performed.231
A different concern in allowing the protection of a production as a
whole is the difficulty of managing the ownership of the derivative work.
If the work for hire doctrine applies, the production company or hiring
party is the author of the work or of the aspects of the work created by
directors and designers acting as employees within the scope of their
employment.232 In this case, managing the work will be relatively sim-
ple, because a single default owner allows any further uses and pursues
any infringement claims. Contracting parties will also have legal default
rules to rely on when negotiating compensation for both the initial work
and for any licensed reproductions.233
But if a design team was to come together to create a work without
creating a formal production company, or if the work for hire doctrine
was inapplicable, manageability problems could arise. In the current
SSDC and USA contracts, collaborators specifically note that they are
maintaining their individual ownership of any intellectual property rights
they have in the production, and they typically reserve the right to claim
copyright. 34 If the result is a group of five or six individuals, each with
the right as a joint author to license further use of the work as a whole
subject to accounting to the other joint authors, any of them might use or
abuse their rights in the production in ways that result in animosity be-
tween the authors. On the other hand, despite possible complexity, mul-
tiple parties jointly own other forms of property despite potential man-
agement problems. Also, most companies producing plays are more in-
terested in creating a new production of a play rather than simply repro-
ducing what another company has developed. Licensing will only be
appealing for very popular shows that are often produced by those in the
industry and for astute business people who are more than capable of
handling a potentially complicated ownership structure.
It is questionable whether theatre industry participants will be suffi-
ciently protected by copyright protection alone when one considers the
effect of the work for hire doctrine and the ongoing rental industry for
sets and costumes. If a production's copyright vests in the production
company that hired the design team, the production itself receives
231. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000). The owner of the copyright for a literary or dramatic work has
the exclusive right of public performance, so any legal production must have the playwright's per-
mission. id.
232. § 101.
233. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749-50 (1989).
234. LORT/USA Agreement, supra note 20, at 12; SSDC CBA, supra note 20, at 27-28.
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protection from copying, but only an additional right of attribution would
protect the designers' interest in being given credit for their work. If the
designer enters into an undesirable contract, that individual's work could
be rented, sold, licensed, or copied by the copyright-owning production
company without the director or designer receiving any additional credit
or compensation. Given the thriving rental business for opera sets,
musical costumes, and props,2 35 copyright protection provides only the
minimum protection needed to sufficiently promote the art form; attribu-
tion rights are also needed.
One must weigh the potential problems against the potential benefit
of affording these works copyright protection. While the individual de-
signers and directors involved in the collaborative process may require
the additional protection of a right of attribution, as advocated in this
Comment, some kind of clear protection for theatrical productions is
both desirable and necessary. In some cases, the management of the in-
tellectual property rights involved may be difficult, but any challenges
are not insurmountable and the protection provided outweighs the poten-
tial difficulties.
B. Impact of Creating a Right of Attribution
Codifying a right of attribution would likely have little impact on
the theatre industry. Requiring attribution represents a minimal change
from the traditional practices of the industry and codifies the practices
typically required in well-negotiated contracts.236 Acknowledging these
moral rights in a statute would serve to protect those individuals whose
work either is created outside a union environment or has been sold or
stolen.237 It would also protect the public from the false attribution of a
work to a well-known and respected artist who played no part in the
work's creation.
As this right closely resembles the rights of attribution established
for visual artists under VARA, it would produce no greater strain on the
courts than the strain already produced by attribution rights in the visual
arts. While there was significant concern about granting moral rights to
works beyond those of visual art when VARA was passed, those con-
cerns were primarily focused on the motion picture and audiovisual
235. See, e.g., American Conservatory Theater, Costume and Prop Rentals, http://www.act-
sf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=aboutrentals-costume_prop (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); Prop
City, http://www.propcity.com/default.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); Scenic Arts Studios,
http://scenicarts.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); Seattle Opera, Rental Index,
http://www.seattleopera.org/rentals/intro/index.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
236. See, e.g., LORT/USA agreement, supra note 20, at 12-14; SSDC CBA, supra note 20, at
30.
237. See discussion supra Parts IllE, V.A.2.
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industries, not on live performance theatre.238 When considering the im-
pact of a right of attribution, live theatre more closely resembles visual
art than a motion picture. A production is generally performed a limited
number of times, similar to a limited edition piece of art. The end of the
performance run or the destruction of the designs can effectively destroy
the production, as it is highly unusual for multiple copies of the same
production to exist.2 39 Also, while motion pictures and audiovisual
works are typically made for hire and thus owned by the production com-
pany,24° the theatre industry specifically attempts to prevent ownership of
a designer's or director's work from vesting in the production or theatre
241company through clear clauses in their design and directing contracts.
A single federal statute on the subject would simplify the matter for the
courts and everyone involved in such disputes by both eliminating the
need to rely on the various applications of state common law and provid-
ing a single federal cause of action for any misattributions.
VII. CURTAIN: CONCLUSION
Let us revisit our director. Under the analysis suggested in this
Comment, instead of being given vague answers when she called her
attorney, she would receive a clear answer and two potential courses of
action. If she and her design team had retained joint ownership of the
copyright of their work, they could pursue a copyright infringement ac-
tion against the copying theatre, because the resulting production would
qualify for copyright protection. While copyright infringement is rarely
242a simple matter to prove, an infringement suit is a possible course of
action that provides a more straightforward answer to the director. With
a clear legal doctrine on her side, she and her team could also attempt to
negotiate a licensing agreement with the infringing theatre.
Alternatively, the director could attempt, as an individual, to assert
her right of attribution and receive credit for her work. Because a right
of attribution is inalienable, this claim could succeed even if the director
had not retained ownership of her copyright or if that ownership had
vested in her production company under the work for hire doctrine.
What is perhaps most important in applying and changing current
copyright laws to address the needs of the theatre industry is legal doc-
trine that takes into account the unique character of the art. If the form is
238. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6919.
239. PARKER & WOLF, supra note 9, at 176.
240. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5.
241. See, e.g., LORT/USA agreement, supra note 20, at 12; SSDC CBA, supra note 20, at 27-
28.
242. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 45, at chs. 12-14.
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to be promoted instead of deadened by legal protection, then it is vital to
balance the protection of both the collaborative nature and product of the
art with the need for the individual artists to receive their due credit.
Providing for moral rights and a holistic approach to copyright protection
balances the needs and interests of directors and designers in such a way
that supports and furthers the art form as required by the Constitution.
